14 judgments interpreting, applying, or limiting the provisions of this Act. Sorted by court tier then reverse-chronologically.
Whether you were dishonest is decided by what ordinary, honest people would think — not by whether you personally believed you were behaving honestly. Your own moral compass doesn't get you off; the jury's does.
The Supreme Court disapproved the two-stage Ghosh test for dishonesty; the test is whether the defendant's conduct was dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people, judging their state of mind subjectively only as to what they knew or believed about the facts.
Holding. Dishonesty under the Theft Act is judged by the objective Ivey standard; the Ghosh subjective second limb no longer applies.
Accepting a gift can be theft if you took it dishonestly — for example, sweet-talking a vulnerable person into handing over their savings. The fact that the gift was legally valid doesn't protect you if you knew the giver was being exploited.
Even a valid indefeasible gift can amount to appropriation under s.3 if it is dishonest; the House held that the civil/criminal interface does not constrain appropriation, which is a neutral concept divorced from civil-law title.
Holding. Receipt of property by way of a valid gift can be appropriation under s.3 where the receipt is dishonest.
Doing anything that only the owner is allowed to do with their property — even with their agreement — counts as 'taking' it for theft. Whether you're actually a thief then turns on whether you were dishonest and meant to keep it.
Appropriation under s.3 includes any assumption of any of the rights of an owner, whether or not consented to; the House overruled R v Morris on this point and confirmed that consent is irrelevant to appropriation (though may be relevant to dishonesty and intent).
Holding. Appropriation under s.3 is any assumption of an owner's rights, regardless of consent.
If you bought something innocently and later realised it was stolen, simply selling it on doesn't make you a handler. The 'other person' you're acting for has to be someone already mixed up in the theft, not just your buyer.
Section 22 handling requires the disposal or realisation to be 'by or for the benefit of another person'; an innocent purchaser who later sells goods that turn out to be stolen does not handle them by selling — only the original thief or earlier handler can be 'another person' for this purpose.
Holding. Section 22 handling does not catch onward sale by an innocent purchaser; the 'for the benefit of another' phrase has a narrow construction.
Crown Court judges and juries must use the objective Ivey test for dishonesty in theft and fraud trials. The older question of whether you realised ordinary people would see your conduct as dishonest is gone — only their view matters.
The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) confirmed that the Ivey objective test for dishonesty applies in criminal cases including theft and fraud; Ghosh is no longer good law in the criminal courts.
Holding. Ivey's objective dishonesty test binds the criminal courts; the Ghosh subjective limb is overruled in criminal proceedings.
You don't have to spell out a threat to be a blackmailer. Pointing a gun and gesturing at the till is enough of a demand. The offence is committed when you both know you've no right to ask, and know that threatening is the wrong way to ask.
A demand under s.21 need not be in express terms; conduct (such as pointing a gun and demanding pain-relieving medication) can constitute an unwarranted demand with menaces if the defendant knows there is no reasonable ground for the demand or that the menaces are inappropriate.
Holding. Blackmail under s.21 covers implicit demands made by conduct; the unwarranted-demand limb has two cumulative subjective elements.
Borrowing something and giving it back isn't theft — unless what you return is essentially worthless. Returning a season ticket after the last match, or a battery with no charge left, can count as if you'd kept it for good.
Intention to deprive 'permanently' under s.6 is satisfied where the property is returned in such a changed state that its goodness, virtue or practical value is exhausted; mere borrowing without consumption of the property's worth is insufficient.
Holding. Section 6 catches borrowing only where the thing returned has been drained of its essential value.
If you grab someone's belongings and then use force — for example, tying them up so you can get away with the loot — that's still robbery. The theft is treated as ongoing while you're making off, not finished the instant you touch the goods.
Robbery under s.8 requires force used or threatened immediately before or at the time of the theft and in order to do so; appropriation is a continuing act, so force used during the course of the theft (e.g. while tying up the victim before leaving) is sufficient.
Holding. Appropriation for robbery is continuing; force used during the appropriation, not only at its outset, counts.
Even if you're normally welcome somewhere, walking in to steal turns you into a trespasser. A son going into his dad's house to nick the TV is a burglar — permission to visit doesn't cover crossing the threshold to commit a crime.
A person who has general permission to enter premises (e.g. a son entering his father's house) becomes a trespasser when he enters with a purpose unauthorised by the permission — exceeding the scope of permission converts lawful entry into burglary.
Holding. Exceeding the scope of permission to enter renders the entrant a trespasser for s.9 burglary purposes.
For burglary, you have to know — or not care — that you've no right to be there. If you climb through someone's window genuinely believing you've been invited in, you're not a burglar, even if the invitation was based on a mistake.
Burglary under s.9 requires entry as a trespasser; if the defendant knows he has no permission to enter and enters anyway, he is a trespasser — entry obtained by an invitation given on a mistaken understanding of identity does not always defeat trespass.
Holding. Entry as a trespasser under s.9 requires actual knowledge of, or recklessness as to, the lack of permission to enter.
A travel agent who pockets customers' deposits and goes bust isn't necessarily a thief — they only owe a debt. To be guilty, you must have been under a clear duty to keep the specific money or use it for a particular purpose, not just pay it back.
Section 5(3)'s deeming provision (obligation to retain and deal with property) requires a specific obligation to keep the property in specie or in some other form for the relevant person; a general business debt does not engage s.5(3).
Holding. Section 5(3) requires a specific quasi-trust obligation to deal with property in a particular way.
You can be done for stealing your own property. If you sneak your car back from the garage to dodge the repair bill, the garage was lawfully holding it — so taking it without paying is theft, even though it's yours.
Property 'belongs to' another under s.5(1) whenever that other has possession or control; an owner can therefore steal his own property from a person in lawful possession of it (e.g. a garage holding a car for repair).
Holding. Section 5(1) catches anyone in possession or control; an owner can steal property held by another's lawful possession.
You can't steal pure information. Reading and memorising secret documents — without removing the paper — isn't theft. Take the document itself, though, and that's a different matter.
Confidential information (the contents of an exam paper) is not 'property' within s.4(1); a student who read and remembered the paper without removing the physical document could not be guilty of theft.
Holding. Information by itself is not property under s.4; only the physical medium can be the subject of theft.
Borrowing a work van or company car and then taking it for an unauthorised trip after hours can be 'taking without consent'. Once you go beyond what you were allowed to do with the vehicle, the law treats it as if you'd taken it from scratch.
A lawful possessor of a vehicle who uses it for an unauthorised purpose after concluding the authorised use 'takes' it within s.12 — the question is whether the use went beyond what was contemplated in the original consent.
Holding. Section 12 'taking' covers unauthorised use by an initially lawful possessor where the use exceeds the consent given.